A Law and Economics Praxis by Brietzke, Paul H.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 25 
Number 1 Fall 1990 pp.51-58 
Fall 1990 
A Law and Economics Praxis 
Paul H. Brietzke 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul H. Brietzke, A Law and Economics Praxis, 25 Val. U. L. Rev. 51 (1990). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol25/iss1/2 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open 
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at 
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, 
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at 
scholar@valpo.edu. 
REVIEW
A LAW AND ECONOMICS PRAXIS
PAUL H. BRIETZKE*
Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice, by
Robin Paul Malloy. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1990. Pp. x + 163,
$12.95.
This excellent book usefully covers many relevant issues in just a few
pages. Professor Malloy is among the first' to describe a law and economics
praxis, if that good Greek word can now be reclaimed from the Marxists. His
praxis has ideologies mediating between a high-level philosophizing and the
practical uses to which the economists' "tool box" gets put. Most readers
should find this approach more interesting and informative than those in other
introductions to law and economics. 2 Malloy attains the simplicity while
avoiding the narrowness and the superficiality of Chicago School attempts to
account for all of law and other behavior through economics.3
The practice part of Malloy's praxis can be described briefly because he
does it so well. The economics ideas of scarcity and rationality, and the nuts
and bolts of cost-benefit and efficiency analyses, are quickly but effectively
discussed with a view toward resolving definitional issues. Economics comes
across as the making of predictions, which are certainly based on the
manipulation of variables like laws and customs but which even more centrally
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. Perhaps the first comprehensive attempt to describe the effects of political philosophies on
modern law and economics analyses is C. VELJANOVSKI, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMICS: A
RESEARCH REVIEW (1982). This excellent study is for those who are already familiar with the field.
R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986), compares law and economics with jurisprudence (the Empire)
so as to prove the superiority of the latter. See Brietzke, Dworlin Today, (Book Review) 21 VAL.
U.L. REv. 321, 335 (1987). Neither Dworkin nor Veljanovski treat ideologies explicitly, and
Dworkin devotes little attention to the practice of law and economics.
2. E.g., P. BURROWS & C. VEUANOVSKI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW (1981); W.
HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (1979); A. POUINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).
3. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
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depend on the assumptions the analyst chooses to make.4 In only eleven pages,
the Coase Theorem, Pareto efficiency, the Kaldor-Hicks Theory, and Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem are given clear and effective explanations. These
important neoclassical economics tools receive fearsomely complex and technical
treatments from many other authors.' A brief yet authoritative Glossary
supplements Malloy's efforts.6
At the end of the book, the applicability and the inapplicability of
economics tools to five leading cases is examined. The cases concern
unconscionability, the implied warranty of habitability, prisoners' rights to
counsel, comparable worth in employment, and products liability. This "leading
case" strategy permits fairly detailed economics discussions of familiar legal
topics within a brief space, and the cases have been carefully chosen to be
highly suggestive of the (in)applicability of law and economics analyses to other
areas of the law.7 The final Chapter, "Improving Lawyering Skills," reinforces
these lessons by encouraging the reader to practice "recharacterizing" legal
problems among alternative economic approaches. In terms more familiar to
lawyers, this is the means by which a "contracts" problem can become a
"landlord and tenant" problem, in the plaintiff's pursuit of more favorable
doctrines and remedies!
Descriptions of the practice of law and economics are what we would
4. R. MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND
PRACTICE 3, 10, 14-17 (1990). Malloy properly stresses the effects of assumptions on outcomes,
since many mainstream economists - Malloy's "conservative" economists - play down these effects.
See infra note 10. Under their assumptions, Malloy finds that the "market does not care about the
issue of fairness or justice." Id. at 31-32. This kind of personification - the market presumably
lacks the means to "care" about anything - is indicative of the fondness mainstream economists have
for markets. Their faith is also lavished on status quo distributions of wealth and power. Id. at 33,
55. The mainstream assumption that, like other resources, people are fully mobile serves to
dehumanize experience. Id. at 55.
5. Id. at 34-45.
6. Id. at 161-63.
7. See id. at 104-54. Malloy's five cases make out a useful contrast between the judicial
mimicry of market outcomes, which is a by-and-large fairness based on buyers' and sellers'
cumulative judgments, and the judge's rejection of marketplace metaphors in favor of fairness in the
particular (contextualized, disaggregated) case. But judges seldom tell us why they reject the market
metaphor: the judge may be ignorant of economics; the market may be thought to have failed in
some respect, as when certain goods or apartments are not available competitively; or the market
may be deemed an irrelevant metaphor for the behavior being considered. See id. at 111, 143. For
example and despite the disagreement of many mainstream economists, the inequality of bargaining
power seen in unconscionability and some landlord and tenant cases might well be "inefficient." But
a judge who attempts to redress this inequality may be less interested in making economic
predictions than in implementing an egalitarian philosophy (or ideology - see infra note 19) which
horrifies most mainstream economists.
8. R. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 156-60.
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expect from a book of this sort, but we get much more: the deep theories which
underlie alternate economic approaches. The "Comparative" in the subtitle to
Malloy's book refers to a comparative political and legal philosophy. Although
many economists refuse to discuss their philosophical "roots," Malloy makes
these explicit in ways which reduce the monolithic autonomy of the economics
enterprise.
Legal philosophy has faced an unremitting attack for more than a decade;
law and economics from the Right, and Critical Legal Studies from the Left,
have used bellicose and ideologically-charged language to attack the methods and
culture of jurisprudence. The surface (at least) polish of economics graphs and
formulae enabled the economists initially to gain much ground on the
philosophers, but it now looks as if the jurisprudes will hold their own by
devising rigorous responses to criticisms. Malloy usefully documents the points
of contact between these rivals, in ways which will interest philosophers in
economic analysis and which show how philosophy affects an economist's values
and principles. Analytical outcomes will obviously differ if the economist
pursues a philosophy of, for example, "morality, individual liberty and human
dignity" rather than an "altruistic communitarianism. " Malloy's philosophical
analyses also enable the reader to evaluate his or her own ideology, by
pondering how this ideology is shaped by our intellectual culture and how it
influences one's use and understanding of law.
Oversimplifying a bit, presumably in the interests of brevity, Malloy
divides economists into five philosophical schools. These schools describe
contemporary jurisprudes as well: conservative, (contemporary) liberal, Left
communitarian and neo-Marxist, libertarian, and classical liberal. The chapter
devoted to each school is quite brief and selective, although each chapter
concludes with a thoughtful bibliography for further reading. The
conservatives" are the mainstream or Chicago School economists typified by
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. Among these conservatives, rights and
9. Id. at 5. See id. at 2, 4, 8-9.
10. Id. at 60-68. In what may be a semantic quibble, I prefer "neo-conservative" as the name
for this school. A 'conservative" in the literal, Burkean sense merely wishes to conserve the old
and the established within the status quo, while mainstream law and economics wants to turn the
clock back to a 1920s business civilization, to annul egalitarian and participatory New Deal and post-
New Deal reforms. This is a "reactionary" orientation, the opposite of the "progressivism" that
nicely describes contemporary liberals. See infra note 12 and text accompanying. But
.neoconservative" is the politer term, one which properly makes Chicago School goals consistent
with the New Right's agenda. R. MALLoY, supra note 4, at 89 (discussing Chicagoan Richard
Epstein's view that everything since the New Deal is unconstitutional, but classifying Epstein as a
libertarian - see infra notes 15, 24 and accompanying text); McConnell, The Counter-Revolution
in Legal Thought, 41 POL. REv. 18 (1987).
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obligations get reduced to numerical calculations because morality is thought to
be hopelessly subjective. This tactic has the effect, if not the purpose, of
justifying many actions the general public cannot accept, so that conservatives
can advance the de facto morality of "protecting the market model and
promoting efficient (wealth maximizing) outcomes.""
Contemporary liberals reject the broad property rights advocated by
mainstream economists, rights which can be used to undo social reforms and to
otherwise curb a governmental activism under law and economics techniques
akin to a substantive due process. An excellent brief summary of Bruce
Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State 2 is used to typify the liberal
approach shared by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. A book and two
articles 3 are taken to represent the diverse Left communitarian and neo-
Marxist school, the orientations of which are neatly summarized by a quote from
Mark Kelman: "Rules are the opiate of the masses" 4 through which
mainstream economists legitimate hierarchy and inequality in America.
Libertarians are seen as the only school which advocates natural rights, rights
which are sources of private power, an inevitable inequality, and an anti-statist
philosophy. The ideas of Robert Nozick and Richard Epstein are ably
summarized. '
11. R. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 64.
12. See R. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 70-73. Using Ackerman to typify liberals is a useful
tactic in the interests of brevity. But, like the other schools Malloy surveys, the liberals are a
diverse lot. A very different liberalism emerges from Dworkin, for example: see R. DWORKIN,
supra note 1; Brietzke, supra note 1. Further, none of the liberals (or the Left communitarians -
see infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text) Malloy cites are centrally concerned with the issues
addressed by mainstream law and economics; they are critics-in-passing, preoccupied with
establishing their own philosophical theories where economic analyses are tangential. The fullest
account of a contemporary economics liberalism would thus include the "welfare" economists who
are admittedly more influential in Europe than in the U.S. See, e.g., C. ROWLEY & A. PEACOCK,
WELFARE ECONOMICS: A LIBERAL RESTATEMENT (1975); H. VAN DEN DOEL, DEMOCRACY AND
WELFARE ECONOMICS (1979). Needless to say, such inclusions would force Malloy to abandon the
brevity that readers cherish.
13. M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Turley, Introduction: The
Hitchhiker's Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 593 (1987). A more
representative summary of this school is thus given than for liberals. See R. MALLOY, supra note
4, at 76-85.
14. R. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 81 (quoting M. KELMAN, supra note 13, at 63).
15. Id. at 86-92, discussing R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) and R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Other libertarian
.classics" which are not discussed or cited in the Chapter Bibliography are D. FRIEDMAN, THE
MACHINERY OF FREEDOM (1973) and B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980). There is also a Left-libertarianism (anarchism or anarcho-syndicalism) that gets reflected
in the more anti-statist branch of the Left communitarian school, supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
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Classical liberalism differs from libertarianism in seeking to preserve liberty
through a private and public balance. The neoclassical economics model is used
as a metaphor for this balance, but classical liberals differ from conservatives
in holding that the market is merely a means to the end of liberty; efficiency
concerns are "distinctly secondary" for classical liberals.' Although Malloy's
analyses are evenhanded, the reader senses that this school is where Malloy's
sympathies lie, especially as his landmark analysis of Adam Smith is
summarized along with the ideas of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. 7
Philosophy, economics, law, political science, and history were all facets of the
unified "political economy" known to the original classical liberals: Smith,
Bentham, and Mill. A reintegration of their, and our, insights is long
overdue.' 8 Malloy is just the person to accomplish this task, having made a
fine beginning in his book.
A major purpose of Malloy's discussions of philosophical schools,
discussions summarized too briefly here to do them justice, is to demonstrate the
expansive roles that ideology and ideological contradictions play in economic
analyses. The role of ideology is too often ignored by mainstream (positivist)
economists, who sometimes relegate ideology to the role of accounting for things
which economics cannot explain satisfactorily. Thus "ideology" becomes the
reason why some citizens and legislators vote against their short-term economic
self-interest -- a use of ideology which conservatives hope will preserve their
theory's predictive powers. Malloy shows how ideological "visions" of the just
society are reflected in current social arrangements, so that the reader can
determine whether particular legal rules are consistent with, for example, a free
market capitalism. '
9
There are serious divergences among the views of Marx, Keynes, and the
Chicago School, especially in their assumptions about people, markets, societal
consensus, and right and wrong. These divergences show that, like law,
16. R. MAILOY, supra note 4, at 11, 95. See id. at 93-101.
17. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY (3d ed. 1979); Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, Richard Posner
and the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REv. 209 (1988). The latter article
punctures many of the pretensions in conservative claims to have inherited the classical liberals'
mantle.
18. Brietzke, Another Law and Economics, 9 RES. IN L. & ECON. 57, 75 (1986). See also R.
MALLOY, supra note 4, at 2.
19. R. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 5. A clearer demarcation of the roles of philosophy and of
ideology would obviously be useful, but such a deeply-contentious matter could not be disposed of
briefly. As an old saw puts it, I have a philosophy, you have some good ideas, and they have
ideologies. While mainstream law and economics often reduces law and politics to matters of
economics, Malloy comes close to proving that economics is merely a means to ideological ends.
Such arguments could be used by others to reduce economics and law to mere matters of politics,
but the real world is presumably too complex to be captured by such a determination.
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economics cannot be neutral, objective, and predetermined. The contingency
and complexity of the real world makes ideologically-colored interpretations
possible, of whether a particular market has failed for example. The
indeterminacy of economics, which (like law once again) is highly value driven
and which often uses the weak logic of metaphors and arguments by analogy,
is both a cause and an effect of ideological manipulation. As in the forecasting
of economic trends, the outcomes in law and economics "are dependent upon
and limited to the variables considered and the weight given to each
variable."' Lawyers should presumably learn the different ideological "tones"
which can be used in different cases and on behalf of different kinds of clients:
conservative and libertarian arguments usually work for wealthy clients, while
the poor and powerless may need contemporary liberal or Left communitarian
arguments.
Three of Malloy's many examples about the relation between economic
indeterminacy and ideological manipulation will convey the flavor of his
arguments. First, prostitution may be Pareto superior and Kaldor-Hicks efficient
because it apparently provides buyers and sellers with what they want. Yet
prostitution may be inefficient if we also analyze its impact on street crime,
family life,2 and the status of women -- factors which can easily be made into
"externalities" of a neoclassical economics analysis. So, our views on whether
prostitution should be legal will likely turn on whether we "like" it for non-
economics reasons.
Second, Malloy discusses a leading products liability case brought against
the Ford Pinto.' The Ford executives' cost-benefit analysis showed (before
the fact) that it would be cheaper to compensate injured litigants than to redesign
the Pinto. Malloy argues that conservatives and libertarians would rubberstamp
such an analysis: Ford's was a socially-responsible decision because its only
moral duty is to maximize profits as best it can, through the most efficient use
of society's scarce resources. Classical liberals would, on the other hand, see
the need for a moral dialogue since human life cannot be quantified like the
value of a dishwasher, while Left communitarians would see Ford attempting to
legitimate the inequality that exploits consumers by denying them access to
safety information. Particular case facts can thus serve as a kind of Rorschach
Test, an ambiguous figure which acquires meaning when the observer projects
ideological values into it.
20. Id. at 66. See id. at 10, 51-52, 55, 64, 156. See aLso supra notes 2, 4, 7, 9, 11 and
accompanying text.
21. R. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 65.
22. Id. at 148-53 (discussing Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1981)).
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A third example from Malloy concerns the City of Indianapolis. While
City leaders regularly voice such 'down home' values as hard work, rugged
individualism, entrepreneurship, free enterprise, and private property, they
actually practice a "state capitalism" or an "urban socialism" of commercial real
estate owned or subsidized by government and administered by central planning
boards.' For Malloy, an understanding of such ideological contradictions can
be used to expand the range of choice in law reform. But these contradictions
also make it very difficult to pigeonhole theories and theorists in a brief book,
and Malloy admits that the "broader audience" does not break down neatly into
ideological schools.'
Judge Posner, Malloy's quintessential conservative, has claimed classically
liberal credentials in the past, and he now asserts his libertarianism. The souls
of revered classical liberals like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek are
claimed by many of their conservative and libertarian colleagues. The ever-
more-influential Virginia School, which is not discussed by Malloy and which
has formed up around Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, plausibly claims to be
simultaneously classically liberal, neoclassically conservative, and libertarian in
utopian and contractarian ways. Like the one in Indianapolis, these apparent
contradictions suggest that America's is a hybrid ideology, a synthesis of the
schools Malloy discusses that is based on the cardinal virtue of "what works."
It is not that Americans are stupid or unideological; it is that they have a high
tolerance for dissimulation in pursuit of what they want. Consider the
popularity of President Reagan, who was chronically mischaracterized as the
"Great Communicator."
The pragmatism of "what works" is said to be America's distinctive
contribution to philosophy, and the contemporary salience of this pragmatism is
easily seen in daily business and political life. Yet pragmatism plays almost no
role in law and economics or in contemporary jurisprudence, for what seems to
be an academic legion of True Believers. They prize theoretical consistency for
its own sake, and they disdain the messy compromises (bounded rationality,
satisficing, and theories of the second best in economics) that are inevitable in
our diverse society and mixed economy. The Left communitarians may well be
right: the central purpose of all of this ideologizing by conservatives and
libertarians, and probably by contemporary and classical liberals as well, is to
legitimate the status quo. Each school would define this status quo differently
and subject it to different reforms, but they all reify a market system which
could not function if the allocation of wealth and the ownership of resources
were widely contested.'
23. Id. at 7-8.
24. Id. at 157.
25. R. MALLOY, supra note 4, at 48, 53-54, 64, 80.
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If, as Malloy suggests, classical liberals hope to hold the balance among
these fractious schools,' classical liberals would have to rebuild the political
middle pragmatically. They would have to protect the equality dear to Left
communitarians and to contemporary liberals, as well as the liberties cherished
by themselves, conservatives, and libertarians. If this is not done, mainstream
efficiency analyses may, by default, continue to narrow the range of permissible
normative arguments. The poor would likely continue to "sell" (to the police,
social workers, etc.) and the rich to "buy" (e.g., private guards for their foyers)
privacy and the many other alienable rights.
It would be unjust and probably inefficient to reprove Malloy for the book
he did not write, especially as the book he did write is a very good introduction
indeed. But, perhaps as volume two, he could go on to a moderate and
pragmatic reintegration of political economy. There is no agreement over what
to do about disagreement in economics (or in philosophy), so someone like
Malloy could come up with choice of economics rules which are akin to the
choice of law rules explored in a Conflicts course. The benefits of such an
analysis done well and in an ideologically-compelling fashion would be many. 7
We might even be able to derive what George Stigler calls a new logic of public
life,' once we purge mainstream (neoclassical) law and economics of its more
obvious reductionisms, ideological manipulations, and analytical double
standards and false dichotomies. Analysts would then be less likely to get lost
at the (dis)junctures of theory and practice; it would become more difficult to
change the definition of efficiency to suit the ideological context; the political
and moral significance of the drive to equality could be adequately recognized
in economics; and economists would have to abandon analyses conducted purely
in terms of near-perfect private markets versus fatally-flawed governments, and
in terms of arbitrarily private interests which cannot be generalized into a public
interest.
This is obviously a tall order, but it represents my "night thoughts" on
reading Malloy. Your reading of Malloy would likely be very different, a
reading according to your own interests and, dare I add, your ideology. But
read Malloy you should; he is one of the few law and economics scholars
capable of commanding a consensus.
26. See id. at 93.
27. Steven Macedo treats such an analysis as an exercise in legitimation. A principled
moderation is required, one which respects the goodness of good reasons and which accepts
reasonable disagreements and a divergence in moral perspectives. Macedo, The Politics of
Justification, 18 POL. THEORY 280, 281-82, 284, 296 (1990). In particular, a principled resolution
of disagreements over the purposes and effects of property rights is required.
28. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL, J. OF ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 17-18
(1971).
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